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Tortious Tweets: A Practical Guide to Applying
Traditional Defamation Law to Twibel1 Claims
“A reputation once broken may possibly be repaired, but the
world will always keep their eyes on the spot where the crack
was.”2
INTRODUCTION
On March 17, 2009, Courtney Love expressed her outrage with
the “Boudoir Queen,” Dawn Simorangkir, on Twitter3 during a
business dispute over $4,000.4 Simorangkir filed a defamation
action in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, claiming
Love’s tweets5 injured her reputation and negatively affected her
clothing business.6 A week before trial, Love settled the claim for
$430,000.7 Following the settlement, Simorangkir’s attorney
Copyright 2013, by PATRICK H. HUNT.
1. The term twibel is used to describe libelous statements posted on
Twitter. See “Don’t Twibel on Me”: Tweets as Libel Lawsuits, JUSTICIA.COM
(Apr. 1, 2011), http://onward.justia.com/2011/04/01/dont-twibel-on-me-tweetsas-libel-lawsuits/.
2. Mary Eule, Your Reputation—Take It Seriously, EZINEARTICLES (Oct. 17,
2005), http://ezinearticles.com/?Your-Reputation---Take-It-Seriously &id=83895
(quoting Joseph Hall); @AndyBeal, TWITTER (Feb. 15, 2010), https://twitter
.com/#!/andybeal/status/9169919667 (quoting Joseph Hall).
3. Twitter is a “real-time information network” used to share the latest
information about what users find interesting. See About, TWITTER,
http://twitter.com/about (last visited Nov. 8, 2011). See also discussion infra
Part II.
4. Matthew Belloni, Courtney Love to Pay $430,000 in Twitter Case,
REUTERS, Mar. 3, 2011, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011
/03/04/us-courtneylove-idUSTRE7230F820110304.
5. The tweets in question included: “austin [sic] police are morethan [sic]
ecstatic to pick her up she has a history of dealing cocaine, lost all custody of
her child, assault and burglary”; “stay away well well away, and etsy cant [sic]
wait tos e [sic] the backof [sic] her, so goodbye asswipe nasty lying hosebag
[sic] thief, now for pleasant things”; “scorched earth ignore and blacklist, few
people ever deserve our total ignoring butthis [sic] thief and burglar does, austin
[sic] police loathher!orange [sic];” “as one of her many bullied victims smashes
her face soon as shes an assault addict herself ( theres [sic] apprently [sic]
prostitution in her record too”; and “little bassists. goodbye ‘boudoir queen’ to
be replacedby [sic] 100s of great indie designers on etsy that are trained that do
know whattheyredoin [sic].” Complaint at 6–7, Simorangkir v. Love, No.
BG410593 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 2009), available at http://www.citmedialaw.org
/sites/citmedialaw.org/files/2009-03-26-Simorangkir%20Complaint_0.pdf.
6. Id.
7. Shea Bennett, The Price of Defame—Courtney Love’s Twitter Rant
Costs Her $430,000, MEDIABISTRO (Mar. 4, 2011, 11:34 AM), http://
www.mediabistro.com/alltwitter/courtney-love-defame-lawsuit_b6126.
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opined, “One would hope that, given this disaster, restraint of pen,
tongue, and tweet would guide Ms. Love’s future conduct.”8 It
didn’t.
While the Love v. Simorangkir litigation was pending, Love
approached Rhonda Holmes at the Gordon & Holmes Law Firm in
an effort to reenlist9 Holmes as her attorney in a property dispute
involving Love’s late husband, Kurt Cobain.10 Holmes informed
Love that Love’s substance abuse problem would preclude Holmes
from serving as her attorney.11 In response, Love tweeted, “I was f--ing devastated when Rhonda J Holmes Esq [sic] of San Diego
was bought off . . . .”12 Holmes and the law office filed a
defamation suit alleging that Love’s tweets caused “irreparable
damage to plaintiffs’ business, name[,] and reputation.”13 Love’s
motion to dismiss was denied, leaving open the possibility that a
jury will decide whether the tweet could be construed as stating
actual facts14 about Ms. Holmes.15
Defamation actions arising from statements posted to Twitter
are not limited to celebrities.16 In July 2009, the Horizon
8. Jason Beahm, Courtney Love Twitter Defamation Case Settled: Love
Pays $430,000, FINDLAW (Mar. 7, 2011, 5:48 AM) http://blogs. Findlaw
.com/celebrity_justice/2011/03/courtney-love-twitter-defamation-case-settledlove-pays-430000.html.
9. Gordon & Holmes previously represented Love in the Cobain property
dispute on the condition that Love refrain from drug use during the attorney–
client relationship. Id. Love fired the firm and retained another attorney. Robert
Kahn, Lawyers Claim Courtney Love Defamed Them, COURTHOUSE NEWS
SERV. (May 27, 2011), http://www.courthousenews.com/2011/05/27/36895
.htm. Later that year, Love became dissatisfied with her attorney and solicited
the assistance of Gordon & Holmes again. Id.
10. Id.
11. Eriq Gardner, Courtney Love Twitter Defamation Case Moves Forward,
THE HOLLYWOOD REP., Sept. 23, 2011, http://www.hollywoodreporter .com/thresq/courtney-love-twitter-defamation-case-239702.
12. Id.
13. Complaint at 4, Gordon & Holmes v. Love, No. BC-462438, 2011 WL
2062323 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 26, 2011).
14. The First Amendment protects speech that cannot “reasonably [be]
interpreted as stating actual facts about” an individual. Milkovich v. Lorain
Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 17 (1990) (quoting Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell,
485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988)). Accordingly, Holmes will only recover if a reasonable
reader would infer that Love’s tweet conveys “actual facts” about her.
15. Gardner, supra note 11.
16. In another defamation suit, singer Johnny Gill was sued by Ira DeWitt
for tweeting that she hired another vocalist to finish his song and leaked an
unofficial version. Lauren Dugan, Twitter Defamation Cases Are Heating Up,
MEDIABISTRO (Aug. 17, 2011, 3:15 PM), http://www.mediabistro.com/alltwitter
/twitter-defamation-cases-are-heating-up_b12799. See also Julie Hilden, Libel
by Twitter? The Suit Against Kim Kardashian over the “Cookie Diet”,
FINDLAW (Jan. 4, 2010), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/hilden/20100104.html
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Management Group filed a libel action against Amanda Bonnen
for tweeting, “Who said sleeping in a moldy apartment was bad for
you? Horizon realty thinks it’s okay.”17 Fortunately for Bonnen,
who could not afford defense counsel, several attorneys took the
case pro bono and successfully moved for dismissal on the grounds
that “the tweet was not defamatory as a matter of law because the
tweet was indefinite, contained no verifiable facts, was not
sufficiently connected to Horizon and when considered in the
context of Bonnen’s other tweets, should be subject to innocent
construction.”18
More recently, Dr. Jerry Darm sued blogger Tiffany Craig in
Oregon for $1,000,000 claiming that she damaged his reputation by
tweeting about prior disciplinary action taken against the
physician.19 After viewing one of Dr. Darm’s television
commercials, Craig performed a Google search for his name.20 She
then revealed her findings on Twitter, stating: “[A] little bit of
research into @drdarm revealed a pretty nasty complaint filed
against him for attempting to trade treatment for sex in 2001.”21
Darm and Craig reached a settlement agreement on October 7,

(discussing a twibel suit against Kim Kardashian for tweets refuting a third
party’s claim that Kardashian was on a doctor’s “cookie diet”).
17. See Verified Complaint at 2, Horizon Group Management, LLC v.
Bonnen, No. 2009-L-008675, 2009 WL 2231162 (Ill. Cir. Ct. July 20, 2009).
18. Twitter Defamation Case Dismissed, LESLIEREIS.COM (Jan. 23, 2010),
http://www.lesliereis.com/pb/wpb375b750/wp_b375b750.html. Bonnen’s attorney
argued that the tweets, when considered together, could not be interpreted as stating
actual facts about Horizon. 2-615 Motion to Dismiss, Horizon Grp. Mgmt., LLC v.
Bonnen, No. 2009-L-008675 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Nov. 10, 2009), available at http://
www.citmedialaw.org/sites/citmedialaw.org/files/2009-11-10-Bonnen%20Motion
%20to%20Dismiss.pdf. However, the court’s dismissal order did not give reasons
for the dismissal. See Order, Horizon Grp. Mgmt., LLC v. Bonnen, No. 2009-L008675 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Jan. 20, 2010), available at http://www.citmedialaw.
org/sites/citmedialaw.org/files/2010-01-20-Horizon%20v.%20Bonnen%20Dismis
sal%20Order.pdf.
19. Complaint, Darm v. Craig, No. 110708823, 2011 WL 2947342 (Or. Cir.
July 11, 2011). See also Kara H. Murphey, Defamation in 140 Characters or
Less, PORTLAND TRIB., Sept. 7, 2011, http://portlandtribune.com/component
/content/article?id=11881.
20. Murphey, supra note 19.
21. Id.
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201122—approximately two weeks before the parties were due in
court to continue arguing Craig’s motion to dismiss.23
The increased popularity of social media, particularly Twitter,
has been accompanied by a concomitant rise in defamation
lawsuits.24 Despite arguments to the contrary,25 the proliferation of
Twitter use and the associated surge in twibel claims do not require
a dramatic transformation in the legal standards applied to libel
claims. The current standards continue to provide the most
appropriate balance between First Amendment free speech
considerations and the important state interest in protecting
reputation.26 This Comment seeks to assist courts confronted by
twibel cases by demonstrating how traditional defamation
considerations can, and should, be applied to defamatory tweets.27
The two critical components of the traditional analysis are the
plaintiff’s status as a public or private figure and whether the
allegedly defamatory remark relates to a matter of public or private
concern.28 Lower courts have set forth a number of tests to
determine the status of a plaintiff in a defamation action.29 These
tests, coupled with several features of Twitter, provide courts with
ample criteria to adjudicate whether the plaintiff is a public
official–figure or private figure and, consequently, whether the

22. Kara H. Murphey, Blogger, Dr. Darm Settle Landmark Twitter Lawsuit,
PORTLAND TRIB., Oct. 11, 2011, http://portlandtribune.com/component /content
/article?id=13802. Although the terms of the settlement remain confidential, the
allegedly tortious tweet has not been removed from Craig’s Twitter page. Id.
23. Kara H. Murphey, Twitter Standoff, PORTLAND TRIB., Oct. 5, 2011,
http://portlandtribune.com/component/content/article?id=13399. Craig moved to
dismiss under Oregon’s anti-SLAPP law. Id. Anti-SLAPP laws are designed to
discourage “Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation.” Id. Although
Oregon’s anti-SLAPP law was a key issue in the Dr. Darm litigation, this
Comment does not discuss the relationship between anti-SLAPP provisions and
twibel claims.
24. See supra text accompanying notes 4–23.
25. The arguments for revising current defamation law in light of the media
revolution are outlined in Part III infra.
26. See, e.g., Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 (1966) (“Society has a
pervasive and strong interest in preventing and redressing attacks upon
reputation.”).
27. Though this Comment focuses on defamation actions stemming from
libelous communication on Twitter, the proposed approach might readily
transfer to defamation claims arising from posts to other social media platforms
such as Facebook and Google Plus.
28. See generally discussion infra Part I.
29. See infra Part I.C.2.
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plaintiff must establish that the defendant acted with “actual
malice”30 in publishing the defamatory communication.
Additionally, a tweet’s relevance to a matter of public concern
is discernable in the same manner as that of a statement published
in a traditional medium. A statement on a matter of public concern
published in the New York Times would retain its public nature if
posted to Twitter.31 It is possible, however, that an issue might
become a matter of public concern simply by being discussed on
Twitter.32 This Comment will show that public issues arising from
Twitter are identifiable and are easily analyzed under the
traditional approach.
In order to assist courts with applying the traditional
defamation standards to twibel claims, this Comment will first
review the Supreme Court’s defamation case law, highlighting the
emergence of the public figure distinction and “matter of public
concern” considerations and the policies underlying these two
factors. Part II explores the manner in which Twitter is used and
discusses several of the site’s unique features that will help guide
the defamation analysis. Part III outlines the arguments for revising
the current defamation framework and identifies the flaws in these
positions. Part IV begins by demonstrating how the traditional
considerations outlined in Part I could be applied to twibel claims.
This Part also addresses the importance of a broad approach to the
context analysis.33 Part IV argues that a straightforward approach
30. The Court in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan defined actual malice as
knowledge of falsity or a reckless disregard for the truth of the statement. 376
U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964).
31. For instance, a tweet communicating the death of Libyan Colonel
Muammar el-Qaddifi relates to important public issues in the same way that an
article published in the New York Times on the same matter does. Compare
@Afterseven, TWITTER (Oct. 26, 2011), http://twitter.com/Afterseven/status
/129350664819183616 (“Qaddafi Reportedly Died of Wounds Sustained Before
Capture is.gd/Yy4jBz because of course Muslims dont commit war crimes
.#tcot”), with Kareem Fahim et al., Violent End to an Era As Qaddafi Dies in
Libya, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/21/world
/africa/qaddafi-is-killed-as-libyan-forces-take-surt.html?r=1&scp=1&sq=gaddafi
%20is%20dead&st=cse (reporting the death of Qadaffi).
32. A user’s homepage on Twitter notes “trending topics”—that is, “the
hottest emerging topics of discussion on Twitter that matter most” to the user.
FAQs About Twitter’s Trends, TWITTER, http://support.twitter.com/groups/31twitter-basics/topics/111-features/articles/101125-faqs-about-twitter-s-trends (last
visited Jan. 2, 2013).
33. Context is a critical factor in at least two specific areas of defamation
law. First, “[w]hether . . . speech addresses a matter of public concern must be
determined by [the expression’s] content, form, and context . . . as revealed by
the whole record.” Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S.
749, 761 (1985) (emphasis added) (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138,
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to these issues is the most effective method of extending traditional
considerations to twibel claims.
I. @SUPREMECOURT #SETTINGTHESTANDARD34
A. Defining #Defamation
Generally, a statement is defamatory if it “tends so to harm the
reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the
community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing
with him.”35 Defamation can take the form of libel (printed
defamation) or slander (spoken defamation).36 Although specific
defamation law varies from state to state,37 the plaintiff in a
defamation action generally must establish four criteria to recoup
damages: (1) the defendant published a false and defamatory
statement about the plaintiff;38 (2) the defendant made an

147–48 (1983)). Second, context analysis may aid the fact-finder in
distinguishing actionable statements of “actual facts” from protected “subjective
speculation” or “rhetorical hyperbole.” See Biospherics, Inc. v. Forbes, Inc., 151
F.3d 180, 186 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that in light of the “tenor, language, and
context” of the article, the challenged statements were not defamatory because a
reasonable reader would not view them as stating actual facts about the
plaintiff); Lyrissa Lidsky, Silencing John Doe: Defamation & Discourse in
Cyberspace, 49 DUKE L.J. 855, 939 (2000) (suggesting that statements should be
considered in light of their immediate and broader social context to discern
whether the communication should be interpreted as stating actual facts,
“subjective speculation,” or “rhetorical hyperbole”); see also infra Part IV.C.
34. The use of the “@” and “#” symbols on Twitter is explained in depth in
Part II infra.
35. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977). See also PROSSER &
KEETON ON TORTS § 111, at 773 (5th ed. 1984) (“Defamation is that which tends
to injure ‘reputation’ in the popular sense; to diminish the esteem, respect, good
will or confidence in which the plaintiff is held, or to excite adverse, derogatory
or unpleasant feelings or opinions against him.”).
36. 1 ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION § 2.3, at 2-8 (3d ed. 2001).
37. Compare Kimmerle v. New York Evening Journal, Inc., 186 N.E. 217,
218 (N.Y. 1933) (citing Sydney v. MacFadden Newspaper Publ’g Corp., 151
N.E. 209, 210 (N.Y. 1926) (“[W]ords which tend to expose one to public hatred,
shame, obloquy, contumely, odium, contempt, ridicule, aversion, ostracism,
degradation or disgrace, or to induce an evil opinion of one in the minds of
right-thinking persons, and to deprive one of their confidence and friendly
intercourse in society.”), with Madison v. Yunker, 589 P.2d 126, 129 (Mont.
1978) (“Libel is a false and unprivileged publication by writing, printing . . .
which exposes any persons to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, or which
causes him to be shunned or avoided, or which has a tendency to injure him in
his occupation.”).
38. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977).
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unprivileged communication to a third party;39 (3) the defendant is
guilty of a level of fault arising at least to the level of negligence;40
and (4) the communication is actionable per se41 or causes special
harm.42 These criteria alone were sufficient to establish a claim for
defamation until the Court’s decision in New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan.43 For the first time, the New York Times Court considered
the First Amendment implications of the common law tort of
defamation.
B. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan: @PublicOfficals
#ActualMaliceRequired
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,44 L.B Sullivan, the
Commissioner of Public Affairs in Montgomery, Alabama,
brought a defamation claim against four individuals and the New
York Times newspaper.45 Sullivan alleged that an advertisement
implicitly accused him of countering Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.’s
civil rights movement with “intimidation and violence.”46 Under
instructions that the statements in the advertisement were libelous
per se, the jury found for the plaintiff and awarded $500,000 in
damages.47 According to then-existing Alabama law, a statement
was libelous per se if it “tend[ed] to injure a person . . . in his
reputation” or “bring him into public contempt.”48 At the time, the
only defense to libel per se was truth in “all [the expression’s]
particulars.”49
The United States Supreme Court held that requiring a
commentator to prove that his criticism of official conduct is

39. Id.
40. Id. See also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974)
(“[S]o long as they do not impose liability without fault, the States may define
for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster
of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual.”).
41. Statements that are “actionable per se” render the publisher liable for
defamation even though the statement does not cause special harm, unless the
statement is true or the defendant was privileged to publish it. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 569 (1977).
42. Id. § 558.
43. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 256.
46. Id. at 258.
47. Id. at 256, 262.
48. Id. at 267.
49. Id.
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factually true would inevitably lead to self-censorship.50 To
preserve the constitutional guarantees of free speech and freedom
of the press, the Court held that a “public official” may not recover
damages for defamatory statements addressing his official conduct
unless the official can establish that the statement was made with
“actual malice.”51 The Court went on to define “actual malice” as
“knowledge that [the statement] was false or [made] with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not.”52 New York Times
marked the first in a string of decisions that analyzed the First
Amendment’s impact on the common law tort of defamation.
In Rosenblatt v. Baer,53 the Court explained that the “public
official” distinction in New York Times applied to governmental
employees “who have, or appear to the public to have, substantial
responsibility for or control over the conduct of governmental
affairs.”54 Defamation law protects society’s interest in preserving
reputation, yet this interest conflicts with the constitutional
guarantees of free speech and free press in cases where the interest
in public discourse is particularly strong.55 In an effort to resolve
the tension between the conflicting interests, the Court held:
Where a position in government has such apparent
importance that the public has an independent interest in
the qualifications and performance of the person who holds
it, beyond the general public interest in the qualifications
and performance of all government employees, both
elements [the Court] identified in New York Times are
present and the New York Times malice standards apply.56
To ensure that free speech on public issues remains wide open,
the Court has expanded the application of the New York Times
“actual malice” standard to include a broader category of
defamation plaintiffs.

50. Id. at 279. The Court explained:
Under such a rule, would-be critics of official conduct may be
deterred from voicing their criticism, even though it is believed to be
true and even though it is in fact true, because of doubt whether it can
be proved in court or fear of the expense of having to do so. They tend
to make only statements which “steer far wider of the unlawful zone.”
Id. (citing Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958)).
51. Id. at 279–80.
52. Id.
53. 383 U.S. 75 (1966).
54. Id. at 85.
55. Id. at 86.
56. Id.
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C. Extending #ActualMalice to @PublicFigures
1. Distinguishing @PublicFigures from @PrivateFigures
a. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts & Associated Press v. Walker:
Effective #CounterSpeech
The “actual malice” standard was first extended to include
persons that voluntarily involved themselves with the resolution of
public issues. In 1967, the Court decided two companion cases—
Curtis Publishing Company v. Butts57 and Associated Press v.
Walker58—addressing the applicability of the “actual malice”
standard to “persons who are not public officials, but who are
‘public figures’ and [are] involved in issues in which the public has
a justified and important interest.”59
The petitioner in Curtis Publishing published an article
accusing Respondent Butts, the athletic director at the University
of Georgia, of plotting to “fix” a football game between the
University of Georgia (“UGA”) and the University of Alabama.60
Prior to serving as the athletic director, Butts served as the head
football coach at UGA and was well-known in the college football
community.61
Walker filed the libel claim at issue in Associated Press v.
Walker after the Associated Press released a news dispatch
reporting that Walker led a violent crowd against federal marshals
during a “massive riot” at the University of Mississippi.62 The
crowd was protesting federal efforts to compel the enrollment of an
African American student at the university.63 Walker admitted to
speaking with a group of students during the rally but claimed that
he advocated “restraint and peaceful protest” rather than
violence.64
A majority of the Court agreed that the First Amendment limits
state libel law as it relates to public officials and public figures yet
disagreed about the appropriate standard that public figures must
57. 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (plurality opinion).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 134.
60. Id. at 135–36.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 140.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 141. Walker was involved in the issue of physical federal
intervention and openly advocated against such action. Id. at 140. The Court
noted that he “could fairly be deemed a man of some political prominence” due
to his involvement in the issue. Id.
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prove to prevail on a defamation claim.65 Chief Justice Warren’s
concurrence, joined by four other justices,66 concluded that the
New York Times standard extended to public figures allegedly
defamed in relation to their role in matters of public concern.67
Therefore, both public officials and public figures must prove that
the defendant acted with “actual malice” to recover for defamatory
statements related to their role in public issues.
The Court found that both Butts and Walker were public
figures.68 Butts’s status as athletic director at UGA was likely
sufficient to make him a public figure, the Court explained, and
Walker’s “purposeful activity” amounted to a “thrusting of his
personality into the ‘vortex’ of an important public controversy.”69
Public figures are distinguishable from private figures because a
public figure has “commanded sufficient continuing public interest
and [has] sufficient access to the means of counterargument to be
able ‘to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies’ of
the defamatory statements.”70
Although Curtis Publishing and Walker clarified that the New
York Times “actual malice” standard applies to both public
officials and public figures, the Court gave no indication on the
stance it would take with regard to private figures bringing a libel
action.71

65. Id. at 162 (Warren, C.J., concurring). A four-justice plurality stated that
“a ‘public figure’ who is not a public official may . . . recover damages for a
defamatory falsehood whose substance makes substantial danger to reputation
apparent, on a showing of highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme
departure from the standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to
by responsible publishers.” Id. at 155 (plurality opinion). This standard did not
carry the day, however, because four justices joined Chief Justice Warren’s
concurrence. See infra text accompanying note 66.
66. Justice Black and Justice Douglas joined Chief Justice Warren’s opinion
in Curtis Publishing to form a majority on the question of the appropriate
standard for defamation of public figures, despite their view that publishers
should have an absolute immunity from liability for defamation. See Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 336 n.7 (1974).
67. Curtis Publ’g, 388 U.S. at 164 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
68. Id. at 154–55 (plurality opinion).
69. Id.
70. Id. (citing Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927)).
71. The Curtis Publishing plurality was unprepared to establish a standard
for private plaintiffs. See id. at 155 n.19 (“Nor does anything we have said
touch, in any way, libel or other tort actions not involving public figures or
matters of public interest.”).
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b. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.: Extending #ActualMalice
to @PrivateFigures
The petitioner in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,72 a
distributor of nudist magazines, was arrested for violating
Philadelphia’s obscenity laws.73 Following Rosenbloom’s arrest,
Respondent—a local radio station and newspaper—published
reports that he was arrested for distributing “obscene literature”
and was a “smut merchant.”74 Petitioner Rosenbloom filed a libel
action against the radio station, claiming that Respondent’s
characterization of the material as “obscene” constituted libel per
se.75 For the first time since New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the
Court granted certiorari to a case involving a defamation action
filed by a private plaintiff on a matter of public concern.76
A plurality of the Court held that the First Amendment policy
supporting the New York Times standard was equally as
fundamental in the case of private figures.77 To guard against selfcensorship,78 the plurality extended the “actual malice” standard to
cases involving statements about a private-figure plaintiff’s
involvement in a public issue.79
c. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.: Abandoning #Rosenbloom
Only three years later, the Court abandoned the Rosenbloom
plurality’s approach in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.80 The Court
confirmed the holdings in New York Times and Curtis Publishing,
noting that the “actual malice” standard functions as an
72. 403 U.S. 29 (1971) (plurality opinion), abrogated by Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
73. Id. at 32.
74. Id. at 33.
75. Id. at 36 (emphasis added). Respondent’s publications bluntly described
the literature as “obscene.” Id. The trial court later determined that the
publications were not obscene as a matter of law. Id.
76. See supra text accompanying note 71. Until this point, the Court had
only reviewed defamation cases involving public officials and public figures.
77. Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 52. The New York Times standard was
“applied to libel of a public official or public figure to give effect to the
Amendment’s function to encourage ventilation of public issues, not because the
public official has any less interest in protecting his reputation than an individual
in private life.” Id. at 46.
78. The Court noted that a distinction between public and private figures
“could easily produce the paradoxical result of dampening discussion of issues
of public or general concern because they happen to involve private citizens.”
Id. at 48.
79. Id. at 52.
80. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
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“accommodation between [the interest of the press and broadcast
media in immunity from liability] and the limited state interest in
the context of libel actions brought by public persons.”81 The Court
discarded the Rosenbloom approach,82 however, for two reasons.
First, the primary method of recourse for any victim of
defamation is “self help—using available opportunities to
contradict the lie or correct the error and thereby minimize its
adverse impact on reputation.”83 Public officials and public figures
have a greater access to the media, the Court reasoned, and
therefore have a “more realistic” opportunity to counteract false
statements than private figures.84
Second, the Court recognized a “compelling normative
consideration” supporting a distinction between public and private
figures: Public officials and public figures “must accept the certain
consequences of [their] involvement in public affairs” and “run[]
the risk of closer public scrutiny than might otherwise be the
case.”85 The public has an interest in matters that involve a “public
official’s fitness for office.”86
Although these characteristics may not fairly describe every
public official or public figure, the media is “entitled to act on the
assumption that public officials and public figures have voluntarily
exposed themselves to increased risk of injury from defamatory
falsehood concerning them.”87 These two considerations
distinguish public figures and officials from private figures
because the public interest simply does not extend to the conduct
of private figures.88
81. Id. at 343.
82. See supra Part I.C.1.b (discussing the Court’s extension of the “actual
malice” standard to private figures bringing a defamation action).
83. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 344–45 (citing Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 77 (1964)).
87. Id. at 345.
88. Id. Notably, the justifications accepted in Gertz for distinguishing
between public and private figures were explicitly rejected by the plurality in
Rosenbloom. See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971),
abrogated by Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). The
Rosenbloom plurality rejected the “access to media” rationale, stating: “[T]he
unproved, and highly improbable, generalization that an as yet undefined class
of ‘public figures’ will be better able to respond through the media than private
individuals also involved in such matters seems too insubstantial a reed on
which to rest a constitutional distinction.” Id. at 46–47. The plurality also noted
that a figure’s voluntary emergence into the public eye is immaterial to First
Amendment values: “‘Exposure of the self to others in varying degrees is a
concomitant of life in a civilized community.’” Id. (quoting Time, Inc. v. Hill,
385 U.S. 374 (1967)). “Voluntarily or not, we are all ‘public’ men to some
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Because the rationale supporting the heightened burden on
public officials and public figures does not extend to private
figures, the Court rejected the Rosenbloom approach and held that
states may define the appropriate standard of liability for a
publisher of defamatory falsehoods relating to private individuals
but may not impose strict liability for defamatory falsehoods.89
Although the Court’s decision in Gertz explains the
distinguishing characteristics of public figures and officials, the
Court provided little guidance to help lower courts determine
whether a defamation plaintiff is a public or private figure.
2. @LowerCourts Try to Define @PublicFigures
The Rosenblatt Court established a fairly workable standard for
defining a public official in a defamation action. A public official
is a governmental employee whose position is one that “would
invite public scrutiny and discussion of the person holding it,
entirely apart from the scrutiny and discussion occasioned by the
particular charges in controversy.”90
The law is less clear, however, in distinguishing between
public figures and private figures. In Gertz, the Supreme Court
discussed two reasons for distinguishing between public figures
and private figures: the public figure has a greater access to the
media and he has voluntarily placed himself in the public eye.91
Although these characteristics explain the Court’s motivation for
creating the distinction between public and private figures, they do
not establish a test for lower courts to use in making the
distinction.92 Accordingly, lower courts have crafted a test to
distinguish public figures from private figures in defamation
actions.93

degree. Conversely, some aspects of the lives of even the most public men fall
outside the area of matters of public or general concern.” Id. at 48.
89. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347. To recover punitive damages, however, a
private-figure plaintiff must establish “actual malice.” Id. at 349.
90. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86–87 n.13 (1966).
91. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344. See also supra Part I.C.1.c.
92. SACK, supra note 36, § 5.3.1, at 5-18.
93. Id. Whether an individual is a public figure for defamation purposes is a
question of law for the trial court to judge. Rebozo v. Wash. Post Co., 637 F.2d
375, 379 (5th Cir. 1981) (citing Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976)).
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a. “All-Purpose” @PublicFigures Require #CelebrityStatus
There are at least two categories of public figures in
defamation law: “all-purpose” public figures and “limitedpurpose” public figures.94 A person becomes an “all-purpose”
public figure by thrusting “[himself] to the forefront of a particular
public [controversy] in order to influence the resolution of the
issues involved.”95 These individuals “occupy positions of such
persuasive96 power and influence that they are deemed public
figures for all purposes.”97 In Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publications,
Inc., the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that an
“all-purpose” public figure is a “well-known ‘celebrity,’ his name
a ‘household word.’”98 The D.C. Circuit noted, “The public
recognizes him and follows his words and deeds, either because it
regards his ideas, conduct, or judgment as worthy of its attention or
because he actively pursues that consideration.”99 The Waldbaum
Court cautioned that a person might achieve “general” fame
without being known by the public at large.100 The critical inquiry
is whether the individual is known “to a large percentage of the
well-informed citizenry.”101 The court in Waldbaum enumerated
several factors to help a court decide whether an individual is an
“all-purpose” public figure:
The judge can examine statistical surveys, if presented, that
concern the plaintiff’s name recognition. Previous coverage
of the plaintiff in the press also is relevant. The judge can
check whether others in fact alter or reevaluate their
conduct or ideas in light of the plaintiff’s actions. He also
can see if the plaintiff has shunned the attention that the
public has given him and determine if those efforts have
been successful . . . . No one parameter is dispositive; the
decision still involves an element of judgment.
Nevertheless, the weighing of these and other relevant
factors can lead to more accurate and a more predictable
94. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345. The Gertz Court also mentioned a possible
third category of public figure—the “involuntary” public figure—but noted that
this type of public figure is likely to be “exceedingly rare.” Id.
95. Id.
96. Did the Court mean “pervasive” power? SACK, supra note 36, § 5.3.2, at
5-18 n.132 (citing Hill, Defamation and Privacy Under the First Amendment, 76
COLUM. L. REV. 1205, 1216 n.56 (1976)).
97. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345.
98. 627 F.2d 1287, 1294 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1295 n.20.
101. Id.
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assessment of a person’s overall fame and notoriety in the
community.102
Lower courts have generally interpreted the “all-purpose”
public figure test to establish a difficult burden on a defamation
defendant.103 As one judge noted, “[This test] sets up what
amounts to a fairly strong presumption against a finding of
widespread notoriety.”104 Accordingly, few people are truly “allpurpose” public figures.105
b. “Limited-Purpose” @PublicFigures & #VoluntaryThrust
The more common category of public figures “thrust
themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies in
order to influence the resolution of the issues involved.”106 These
“limited-purpose” public figures must prove “actual malice” only
when the defamatory communication relates to their participation
in the particular controversy with which they have voluntarily
associated themselves.107
102. Id. at 1295. See also Wilson v. Daily Gazette Co., 588 S.E.2d 197, 204–
05 (W. Va. 2003) (citing Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at 1295).
103. A defamation defendant must establish “clear evidence of general fame or
notoriety in the community” for the plaintiff to be subjected to the New York
Times “actual malice” standard as an “all-purpose” public figure. In re Thompson,
162 B.R. 748, 766 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1993).
104. Id.
105. Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publ’ns, Inc., 627 F.2d 1287, 1296 (D.C. Cir.
1980). Jerry Falwell, Ralph Nader, and Jimmy Carter are among the few
plaintiffs whom courts have found to be “all-purpose” public figures. Erik
Walker, Defamation Law: Public Figures—Who Are They?, 45 BAYLOR L. REV.
955, 960 (1993) (citing Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F.2d 1270 (4th Cir.1986), rev’d on
other grounds sub nom. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1987)).
Times have changed since Waldbaum was decided in 1980. It is likely that the
number of “household names” has increased over the past 30 years with the
innovation of the Internet, yet the rise in “all-purpose” public figures does not
affect the central theme of this Comment. A rise in the number of “all-purpose”
public figures does not render the traditional defamation analysis unworkable.
Rather, the traditional analysis will account for the increase and ensure that
speech concerning public figures remains protected under the First Amendment.
See infra Part IV.A.
106. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974) (emphasis
added).
107. SACK, supra note 36, § 5.3.3, at 5-20. In Marcone v. Penthouse
International Magazine for Men, the Third Circuit held that an attorney was a
“limited-purpose” public figure in a libel action arising out of a magazine article
indicating that the attorney was guilty of a drug crime for which he was only
indicted. 754 F.2d 1072, 1087 (3d Cir. 1985). The court noted that the attorney
represented many gang members in criminal actions but also met with members at
the gang headquarters and took occasional weekend trips with the gangs. Id. at
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The Waldbaum Court set forth a separate analysis for whether
an individual is a “limited-purpose” public figure.108 First, the
Court must determine whether a public controversy exists.109
Second, the court should discern the plaintiff’s role in the public
controversy.110 To become a “limited-purpose” public figure, the
plaintiff must have played a significant role in resolving the
controversy.111 Third, the defamatory statement must have been
“germane to the plaintiff’s participation in the controversy.”112
Under the Waldbaum decision, a libel plaintiff will only be
considered a “limited-purpose” public figure when these three
prongs are met.
In addition to defining the defamation plaintiff’s public- or
private-figure status, courts must examine the subject matter of the
alleged defamation to determine the level of First Amendment
protection afforded to the speech at issue.

1086. The court concluded, “Given the public nature of the activities at issue
here, the widespread media attention and the significant contact to the Pagans of
a non-representational type, we hold that Marcone has crossed the threshold and
become a limited purpose public figure.” Id. at 1086–87. Because Marcone was
held to be a “limited-purpose” public figure, he would not have to prove “actual
malice” in a libel action arising out of an issue that was not connected to his
gang involvement, such as an article accusing him of adultery.
108. Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at 1296–98. Other courts have developed similar
tests for defining “limited-purpose” public figures. See, e.g., Contemporary
Mission, Inc. v. New York Times Co., 842 F.2d 612, 617 (2d Cir. 1988)
(requiring a defamation defendant to establish that the plaintiff has (1) drawn
public attention to his views to influence their views on the dispute that is the
subject matter of the defamation; (2) voluntarily thrust himself into the specific
public controversy; (3) assumed a prominent role in the public controversy; and
(4) maintained regular access to the media).
109. Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at 1296. A public controversy differs from a
matter of public interest in that a controversy is “a dispute that in fact has
received public attention because its ramifications will be felt by persons who
are not direct participants.” Id. The Waldbaum court noted that courts are not to
question the legitimacy of the dispute. Id. at 1296–97. The only question is
whether the public is debating a specific question.
110. Id. at 1297.
111. Id. See also Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345 (noting the standard for those that
“have thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies”)
(emphasis added).
112. Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at 1298. Essentially, the third prong is only
satisfied if the alleged defamation to injure the plaintiff’s reputation in such a
way that relates to his or her role in the resolution of the public controversy. Id.
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D. Protecting Speech on #PublicIssues: Policy Considerations
The First Amendment is primarily concerned with protecting
speech pertaining to a matter of public concern.113 Accordingly,
defamatory speech related to an important public issue receives a
greater level of constitutional protection than defamatory speech
concerning a purely private matter.114
1. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.: The
Importance of #PublicSpeech
In Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,115 the
Court clarified the important distinction between defamatory
speech on a matter of public concern and defamatory speech
relating to private issues alluded to in New York Times and its
progeny.116 The issue before the Court was whether a private
figure must prove “actual malice” to recover punitive damages for
defamatory speech that did not relate to a matter of public
concern.117
The Court held that a private figure may recover punitive
damages for a defamatory statement related to a purely private
issue, “even absent a showing of ‘actual malice.’”118 Citing Gertz,
the Court noted that the state interest in compensating private
individuals for reputational injury is “strong and legitimate.”119
Furthermore, the First Amendment interest in protecting
defamatory statements about matters of private concern is less
113. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) (“The
general proposition that freedom of expression upon public questions is secured
by the First Amendment has long been settled by our decisions.”); Hustler
Magazine, Inc., v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988) (“At the heart of the First
Amendment is the recognition of the fundamental importance of the free flow of
ideas and opinions on matters of public interest and concern.”).
114. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749,
762 (1985).
115. 472 U.S. 749 (plurality opinion).
116. Before the Court decided Dun & Bradstreet, the Court’s discussions
centered on whether the plaintiff was a public or private person. The subject
matter of the speech at issue in those cases generally related to matters of public
concern, yet the question of whether the First Amendment protected speech on
matters of private concern was left undecided. See Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts,
388 U.S. 130, 155 n.19 (1967).
117. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 472 U.S. at 751. Contra Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (The Court broadly ruled that “[s]tates may not permit
recovery of presumed or punitive damages, at least when liability is not based on
a showing of [‘actual malice’].”).
118. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 472 U.S. at 761.
119. Id. at 757 (citing Gertz, 418 U.S. at 348).
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compelling than the interest in protecting matters of public
concern.120
The speech at issue in Dun & Bradstreet—false credit reports
issued to a contractor’s creditors—were not matters of public
concern in light of the “[expression’s] content, form, and context . . .
as revealed by the whole record.”121 The Court reasoned that the
speech only concerned the speaker’s individual interests and specific
business audience.122 Thus, it was not the sort of speech deserving
special First Amendment protection to guarantee that “debate on
public issues [will] be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.”123
The plurality decision in Dun & Bradstreet is important for
three reasons.124 First, it vastly narrowed the category of speech
that is subject to Gertz’s high level of protection by permitting
states to regulate as they see fit defamatory communication
relating to matters of purely private concern.125 Second, the
decision puts courts in charge of judging whether the statement in
question in a defamation action is a matter of public interest.126
Third, the Court provided little guidance to help lower courts
distinguish between matters of public concern and matters of
purely private concern.127 The public–private subject matter
distinction was further developed in the Court’s recent decision
involving funeral picketing.
2. Snyder v. Phelps: #OverallThrust
The Respondent in Snyder v. Phelps,128 Westboro Baptist
Church, picketed Lance Corporal Matthew Snyder’s funeral with
hateful signs in an effort to spread its message that God hates
120. Id. at 758–59. “[S]peech on matters of public concern . . . is at the heart
of the First Amendment’s protection.” Id. (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
121. Id. at 761 (quoting Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138, 147–48 (1983)).
122. Id. at 762.
123. Id. (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270
(1964)).
124. SACK, supra note 36, § 1.2.7, at 1-23.
125. Id.
126. Id. See also Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 472 U.S. at 785 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (“Without explaining what is a ‘matter of public concern,’ the
plurality opinion proceeds to serve up a smorgasbord of reasons why the speech
at issue here is not.”).
127. See SACK supra note 36, § 1.2.7, at 1-23–1-24. See also Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc., 472 U.S. at 786 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The credit reporting
at issue here surely involves a subject matter of sufficient public concern to
require the comprehensive protections of Gertz.”).
128. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011).
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America for tolerating homosexuality.129 Matthew Snyder’s father
sued the church for, among other things, defamation and
intentional infliction of emotional distress.130 The validity of
Snyder’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress
hinged “on whether [the] speech [was] of public or private
concern.”131
The Court noted that because the majority of the signs related
to matters of broad public concern—namely “the political and
moral conduct of the United States and its citizens, the fate of our
Nation, homosexuality in the military, and scandals involving the
Catholic clergy”132—Westboro’s speech concerned topics of
legitimate public interest. The Court glossed over the signs
personally attacking the Snyders,133 stating: “[E]ven if a few of the
signs . . . were viewed as containing messages related to Matthew
Snyder or the Snyders specifically, that would not change the fact
that the overall thrust and dominant theme of Westboro’s
demonstration spoke to broader public issues.”134
Additionally, the Court found that the “context” of the
speech135 did not transform the speech into a matter of private
concern.136 The adoption of an overall-thrust-and-dominant-theme
approach implies that the First Amendment may protect individual
remarks within a larger communication.137 Thus, a string of tweets
relating to a matter of public interest might be constitutionally
protected under the First Amendment even if a single tweet in the

129. Id. at 1213.
130. Id. at 1214. The defamation case was dismissed at the district court, but
the jury found that Westboro’s actions amounted to the intentional infliction of
emotional distress. Id.
131. Id. at 1215. Cf. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56
(1988) (holding that a public figure may not recover for the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress unless he shows that the publication contains a
false statement of fact that was made with “actual malice”).
132. Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1217.
133. The Court acknowledged that several signs might be viewed as directly
addressing the Snyder family. Id. These signs included messages such as
“You’re Going to Hell” and “God Hates You.” Id.
134. Id. (emphasis added).
135. Snyder argued that the connection between his son’s funeral and the
speech at issue made the speech a matter of private concern. Id.
136. Id.
137. That is, provided that the speech may be broadly construed as public
speech and that “there [is] no pre-existing relationship or conflict between [the
parties] that might suggest [the defendant’s] speech on public matters [is]
intended to mask an attack on [the plaintiff] over a private matter.” Id.
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collection is nothing more than a personal attack on a public (or
private138) figure.
II. ENTER SOCIAL MEDIA: #WELCOME @TWITTER
Twitter is “a real-time information network that connects
[users] to the latest stories, ideas, opinions, and news about what
[they] find interesting.”139 Users take advantage of Twitter to
communicate with a broad audience: Over 100 million active users
on Twitter contribute approximately 230 million tweets per day.140
When Twitter users, referred to as tweeters or twitterers,141 sign in
to the website, the user initially views his or her “timeline.”142 The
“tweets”143 from each user the tweeter “follows”144 are posted in
chronological order on his or her timeline.145 At the top of each
user’s timeline there is a box with the question “What’s
Happening?”146 By typing a message into this box, tweeters may
share whatever is on his or her mind with members that follow the
user.147 Tweets are limited to 140 characters, including spaces.148
By default, these messages are available to anyone with a Twitter

138. The Snyder Court did not analyze Mr. Snyder’s public- or private-figure
status. See generally Snyder, 131 S. Ct. 1207.
139. About, supra note 3.
140. Leena Rao, Twitter Opens the Kimono on Web Analytics; 3 Million Sites
Now Using Tweet Button, TECHCRUNCH.COM (Sept. 13, 2011), http://techcrunch
.com/2011/09/13/twitter-analytics/.
141. The Twitter Glossary, TWITTER, https://support.twitter.com/articles
/166337-the-twitter-glossary#t (last visited Oct. 9, 2011).
142. What Is a Twitter Timeline?, T WITTER, https://support.twitter
.com/articles/164083-what-is-a-timeline (last visited Dec. 17, 2012).
143. Tweet is used to describe both a message posted via Twitter as well
as the act of posting a message. See The Twitter Glossary, supra note 141
(defining Tweet (noun) and Tweet (verb)).
144. When a user “follows” another user, he is subscribing to the user’s tweets.
See FAQs About Following, TWITTER, http://support.twitter.com/groups/31-twitterbasics/topics/108-finding-following-people/articles/14019-what-is-following (last
visited Dec. 17, 2012).
145. What Is a Twitter Timeline?, supra note 142. For example, if user A
follows user B, each tweet that user B posts will appear on user A’s timeline.
146. How to Post a Tweet, TWITTER, https://support.twitter.com/articles
/15367-how-to-post-a-tweet (last visited Oct. 9, 2011).
147. Id.
148. Id. The 140-character limit does not include “@mentions,” however. See
About Tweets (Twitter Updates), TWITTER, https://support.twitter.com/ groups/31twitter-basics/topics/109-tweets-messages/articles/127856-about-tweets-twitter-up
dates (last visited Nov. 6, 2011).
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account.149 However, tweeters have the option to “protect” their
tweets.150 Protected tweets are different from public tweets in
several ways. First, protected tweets are not available through the
website’s search function.151 Users may not view another user’s
protected tweets unless they receive permission first.152
Additionally, tweeters may not “re-tweet,”153 or share, another
tweeter’s protected tweets.154
Users’ actions on Twitter are not limited to simply contributing
to “what’s happening.” For instance, tweeters may re-tweet another
tweeter’s tweets.155 Tweeters may also “mention” other users in
their tweets.156 Additionally, a tweeter may reply to another
tweeter’s tweets by hovering his cursor over the tweet to which he
wishes to reply and clicking the “reply” icon.157 If a third user

149. About Public and Protected Tweets, TWITTER, https://support.twitter
.com/articles/14016-about-public-and-protected-accounts (last visited Oct. 9,
2011).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. A user may share, or re-tweet, another user’s tweet by clicking on the
“re-tweet” link located below the tweet. See FAQs About Retweets (RT),
TWITTER, http://support.twitter.com/groups/31-twitter-basics/topics/109-tweetsmessages/articles/77606-what-is-retweet-rt (last visited Dec. 17, 2012).
154. Id.
155. Id. A tweeter’s ability to re-tweet certain tweets is restricted, however,
in that one user may not re-tweet another user’s protected tweets. See id. A
user’s ability to re-tweet a defamatory statement may exacerbate reputational
injury by introducing the defamatory comment to a new audience each time the
tweet is re-tweeted. Defamatory re-tweets present two unique issues that are not
addressed in this Comment: First, to what extent is a user liable for re-tweeting a
defamatory comment originally published by a third party? Second, to what
extent is the original tweeter liable for damages caused by a defamatory retweet? To address these issues, it may be helpful to examine the interplay
between section 230 of the Communications Decency Act and the common law
doctrine of republication liability. Under the common law, the original publisher
of a defamatory statement would be liable for damages caused by republication
if republication could be reasonably anticipated. See SACK, supra note 36, §
2.7.2, at 2-91–2-92. However, § 230 may protect the re-tweeter from liability
because neither Internet service providers nor Internet users “[are] treated as the
publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content
provider.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2006). Thus, in the context of a claim for retweet liability, a court must decide whether a re-tweeter is a “user” under § 230.
156. What Are @Replies and Mentions?, TWITTER, https://support.twitter
.com/articles/14023-what-are-replies-and-mentions (last visited Oct. 9, 2011). A
user mentions another user by typing the user’s handle into the tweet preceded
by the “@” symbol. Id.
157. Id.
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follows both the original tweeter and the replying tweeter, the
reply will show up in the third party’s timeline.158
Another important feature of Twitter is the tweeter’s ability to
link tweets to a specific subject matter by including the “#” symbol
followed by keywords describing the subject of the tweet.159 When
a tweeter views a tweet with a “#” symbol, he may click the
“hashtag”160 and view a list of all tweets in that category.161
Protected tweets, however, are only visible to tweeters that have
been approved by the author.162 By using hashtags to mark a
tweet’s relevance to a particular category, the user potentially
increases his tweet’s publicity.163
Several commentators have argued that the traditional
defamation analysis should be reworked to account for changing
media landscape, including the boom in the popularity of social
media websites like Twitter.
III. @COURTS SHOULD IGNORE COMMENTATORS’ CRY FOR
DEFAMATION REFORMATION
Commentators have argued that the recent changes to the
media require a new (or revised) approach to modern defamation
law.164 Such calls for reform in defamation law overcomplicate the
158. Id.
159. What Are Hashtags (“#” Symbols)?, TWITTER, https://support.twitter
.com/articles/49309-what-are-hashtags-symbols (last visited Oct. 9, 2011). For
example, users tweeting about the Super Bowl might include #SuperBowl in the
their tweets. The “hashtag” would become a hyperlink that, if clicked on, would
link users to other tweets discussing the Super Bowl at that time.
160. Tweeters use the #, called a hashtag, to categorize tweets. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. One website keeps an up-to-date list of hashtags that are trending on
Twitter, and it includes whether the hashtag is becoming more popular, less
popular, or remaining constant. See Trending on Twitter, HASHTAGS.ORG,
http://www.hashtags.org/trending-on-twitter/ (last visited Jan. 2, 2013).
164. See, e.g., David Lat & Zach Shemtob, Public Figurehood in the Digital
Age, 9 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 403 (2011) (arguing that the change in the
media landscape has rendered the Gertz distinction between public and private
figures obsolete); Ann E. O’Connor, Note, Access to Media All A-Twitter:
Revisiting Gertz and the Access to Media Test in the Age of Social Networking, 63
FED. COMM. L.J. 507 (2011) (proposing that the “access to media” consideration
in Gertz should be revisited due to the proliferation of social media); Aaron
Perzanowski, Comment, Relative Access to Corrective Speech: A New Test for
Requiring Actual Malice, 94 CAL. L. REV. 833 (2006) (proposing a balancing test
for requiring “actual malice” that accounts for “cacophony of internet speech” and
the “increased diversity among defamation defendants and the concomitant variety
of corrective speech opportunities”); Glenn H. Reynolds, Libel in the
Blogosphere: Some Preliminary Thoughts, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1157, 1165
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analysis by failing to consider a practical application of traditional
defamation law to libel claims in new-age media, as well as the
policies the traditional analysis supports. Revising the defamation
analysis to provide added protection to every post or tweet would
unnecessarily provide First Amendment protection to nonpublic
speech. Additionally, this approach would leave parties who are
not “public figures” under traditional standards without a means of
redress for reputational damage caused by a tortious tweet. This
Part proceeds by briefly explaining the arguments for reforming
defamation law and identifies their shortcomings.
A. @PrivateFigures Lack Meaningful Audience in the Twitterverse
David Lat and Professor Zach Shemtob argue that the Gertz
“public/private [figure] distinction” should be abandoned due to
changes in modern media.165 Instead, the authors urge courts to set
Gertz aside in favor of Justice Brennan’s opinion in Rosenbloom v.
Metromedia, Inc. for two reasons.166

(2006) (arguing that libelous statements posted online should be analyzed under a
slander analysis rather than a libel analysis); Julie Hilden, Should the Law Treat
Defamatory Tweets the Same Way It Treats Printed Defamation?, JUSTICIA.COM
(Oct. 3, 2011), http://verdict.justia.com/ 2011/10/03/should-the-law-treatdefamatory-tweets-the-same-way-it-treats-printed-defamation (arguing that twibel
claims do not fit well within traditional defamation law); Matt Belloni & Eriq
Gardner, Courtney Love’s Tweets Lead to Unique Defamation Showdown, THE
HOLLYWOOD REP., Jan. 4, 2011, http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/blogs/thresq/courtney-love-s-tweets-lead-68193 (statement of defamation defense attorney
Alonzo Wickers) (“The way Twitter is evolving, it seems to be more of a means to
express opinion. I would hope courts give tweets the same latitude as they do an
op-ed piece or a letter to the editor.”). Unlike op-ed pieces, posts on Twitter are
not immediately recognizable as opinion. Publications contained in the “op-ed”
section of a newspaper are self-proclaimed opinion and are not to be taken as
factual statements. Twitter, on the other hand, contains a mixture of opinion, news,
and meaningless commentary. See PEAR ANALYTICS, TWITTER STUDY—AUGUST
2009 (2009), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/18548460/Pear-AnalyticsTwitter-Study-August-2009. For this reason, whether a statement made on Twitter
is protected as a statement of pure opinion is better analyzed under the Court’s
opinion in Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990). See infra Part
IV.C.2.
165. Lat & Shemtob, supra note 164, at 410.
166. Id. at 410. The Rosenbloom plurality held that both public and private
figures must prove “actual malice” to recover for a defamatory statement
relating to their roles in public issues. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403
U.S. 29 (1971) (plurality opinion), abrogated by Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U.S. 323 (1974).
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First, they argue that the nature of modern media has
undermined the self-help rationale set forth in Gertz.167 The
authors point out that, due to the availability of blogging and social
media, “ordinary citizens have historically unprecedented access to
effective communication channels.”168 Consequently, they
contend, the average citizen has the ability to counter defamatory
statements in a manner sufficient to override the “access to media”
rationale for distinguishing between public and private figures.169
Lat and Professor Shemtob’s argument merely pays lip service
to one critical issue—posting a rebuttal on Twitter does not
guarantee that anyone will read the reply.170 They acknowledge
that the platform for speech on Twitter is not shared equally but
argue that equal access to media is not required under Gertz.171 To
say that all Twitter users do not have an equal voice on the website
is an understatement. One source revealed that the average Twitter
user only has 126 followers.172
An average user would likely be hard-pressed to effectively
rebut a defamatory statement posted by a user with a larger than
average number of followers. Moreover, for the rebuttal to be
“effective,” it would have to reach at least some of the audience
that had access to the original statement.173 For example, the
damages resulting from a defamatory tweet posted by user A with
1,000,000 followers about user B with 10 followers are unlikely to
be mitigated if user B simply posts a tweet rebutting user A’s
statement. User B could “mention” user A in a tweet, hoping that
user A will re-tweet his rebuttal. Yet, courts would be ill-advised to
acknowledge this approach as “effective” counter-speech because
the rebuttal’s potential effectiveness hinges on whether the
167. Lat & Shemtob, supra note 164, at 410.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 411.
170. Taken a step further, this argument completely ignores the possibility
that an individual may not have access to the Internet or the means to afford a
computer. Similarly, some potential defamation plaintiffs may have no desire to
engage in social media use.
171. Lat & Shemtob, supra note 164, at 411.
172. Charles Arthur, Average Twitter User Has 126 Followers, and Only 20% of
Users Go Via Website, THE GUARDIAN: TECH. BLOG (June 29, 2009, 10:24 AM),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/blog/2009/jun/29/twitter-users-average-apitraffic. Although this number may be slightly outdated, reliable sources as to the
current average number of Twitter followers are not readily available. Nonetheless,
the current average is certainly less than the number of followers that marquee
celebrities like Lady Gaga have amassed. See @ladygaga, TWITTER,
https://twitter.com/#!/ladygaga (last visited Jan. 31, 2012) (Lady Gaga has over 18
million followers.).
173. O’Connor, supra note 164, at 524.
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defamer decides to publish (by re-tweeting) the response.174
Although modern technology provides some private individuals
greater access to the media, the increased access does not grant
most private figures an effective means to counter defamatory
statements posted by widely read users.
Lat and Professor Shemtob’s second proffered justification for
discarding Gertz in favor of Rosenbloom is that modern technology
has “blurred, if not eliminated,” the public–private figure
distinction.175 They argue that the Gertz rationale fails to consider
two byproducts of the media revolution: the “microcelebrity” and
the “niche celebrity.”176 Instead of dividing fame between a few
celebrities and millions of “nobodies,” “fame . . . is distributed along
a spectrum.”177 “Microcelebrities”—those figures somewhere in the
middle of the spectrum, such as reality TV stars and prominent
bloggers—will continue to grow in number as society is broken into
many “microcultures.”178 Justice Brennan’s statement that
“[v]oluntarily or not, we are all ‘public’ men to some degree,”179
they reason, “ring[s] even more true in the digital age.”180
The rise in “microcelebrities” does not justify abandoning the
Gertz distinction between public and private figures. The argument
that commentary about “microcelebrities” should be protected
unless made with “actual malice” fails to consider the important
“normative consideration”181 implicit in the First Amendment. The
purpose of protecting speech about public officials and public
figures is to ensure that “public criticism” is uninhibited.182 Of
course, if a “microcelebrity” involves himself in a public
controversy, he may become a “limited-purpose” public figure
under the Waldbaum analysis.183 But, barring any involvement in a
174. Accordingly, user B should not be considered a public figure due to his
presence on Twitter alone. User B might be a public figure under the traditional
analysis if he is a household name or has thrust himself to the forefront of a
public controversy, see infra Part IV.B, but the fact that he is on Twitter does
not justify forcing him to prove that user A acted with “actual malice.” This
approach is akin to considering a college student a public figure in a lawsuit
against the New York Times simply because the student might be able to publish
a rebuttal in the campus newspaper.
175. Lat & Shemtob, supra note 164, at 410.
176. Id. at 413.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 48 (1971), abrogated by
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
180. Lat & Shemtob, supra note 164, at 413.
181. Public figures must “accept certain necessary consequences of [their]
involvement in public affairs.” Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344.
182. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 278 (1964).
183. See supra Part I.B.2.b.
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public controversy, there is no reason to afford speech about
“microcelebrities” the heightened level of First Amendment
protection outlined in New York Times and its progeny.184
Additionally, Lat and Professor Shemtob support their
argument that everyone is a public figure in some regard by noting
the rise of the “niche celebrity.”185 They contend the rise of
specialized blogs and interest groups within social networks makes
it “startling easy” to become a celebrity within a particular area of
interest.186 Just as with the “microcelebrity,” a “niche celebrity’s”
renown alone is insufficient to undermine the policy consideration
set forth in Gertz. As the Court noted in Dun & Bradstreet:
“[S]peech solely in the individual interest of the speaker and its
specific business audience . . . warrants no special protection when
. . . the speech is wholly false and clearly damaging to the victim’s
business reputation.”187 Again, if the “niche celebrity” has
involved himself in the resolution of a public controversy, speech
related to his involvement will be protected under the New York
Times “actual malice” standard.188
Lat and Professor Shemtob offer Evan Chesler189 as an
example of a niche celebrity.190 They argue that, although Chesler
might not be classified as an “all-purpose” public figure or
“limited-purpose” public figure, he is a “figure of great interest in
[the legal community].”191 Because the “legal profession is
wealthy, powerful, and prominent, and [Chesler] is a leading figure
within it … [w]hy shouldn’t he have to demonstrate ‘actual malice’
with respect to reporting that covers his leadership of Cravath?”192
Lat and Professor Shemtob bolster their argument that “niche
celebrities,” like Chesler, should be held to the “actual malice”
standard with dictum from Rosenblatt v. Baer: “The subject matter
184. There does not seem to be any justification for protecting a tweet
attacking the reputation of Jersey Shore star Nicole “Snooki” Polizzi with the
New York Times “actual malice” standard.
185. The term niche celebrity refers to “a figure of great interest in [a]
particular field.” Lat & Shemtob, supra note 164, at 414. Lat and Shemtob offer
a prominent attorney as an example of a “niche celebrity” due to his renown in
the legal community. Id.
186. Id. at 413.
187. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 762
(1985) (citing Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y.,
447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980)).
188. See supra Part I.C.2.b.
189. Evan Chesler is the presiding partner at a leading law firm, Cravath,
Swaine & Moore. Lat & Shemtob, supra note 164, at 413.
190. Id. at 414.
191. Id.
192. Id.
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may have been only of local interest, but at least here, where
publication was addressed primarily to the interested community,
that fact is constitutionally irrelevant.”193 In so doing, the authors
confuse two separate areas of defamation law: classification of the
plaintiff and classification of the subject matter.194 The Court’s
statement in Rosenblatt—that the subject matter was important to a
specific community—was unrelated to the plaintiff’s classification.
By stating that the subject matter of the speech was an important
issue for a particular community, the Court was merely conceding
the first issue—that is, that the allegedly defamatory speech at
issue related to a matter of public concern. The key issue in
Rosenblatt was whether the plaintiff was a “public official.”195

193. Id. (citing Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 83 (1966)). Lat and
Professor Shemtob also cite to Justice Brennan’s dissent from the Court’s denial
of certiorari in Lorain Journal Co. v. Milkovich to support their argument that
those involved in issues that are relevant only to a small community should still
be held to the New York Times standard in an action for defamation. Lat &
Shemtob, supra note 164, at 414 n.50 (quoting Lorain Journal Co. v. Milkovich,
474 U.S. 953, 963 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting)). The author’s reliance on
Justice Brennan’s argument that the Court’s commitment to free speech “applies
as much to debate in the local media about local issues as it does to debate in the
national media over national issues,” and that
[t]his Court’s obligation to preserve the precious freedoms established
in the First Amendment is every bit as strong in the context of a local
paper’s report of an incident at a local high school as it is in the
context of an advertisement in one of the Nation’s largest newspapers
supporting the struggle for racial freedom in the South
is misplaced. Id. The public issue in Lorain Journal Co. involved a brawl at a local
high school during a wrestling match and allegations that the wrestling coach, who
is also a teacher at the high school, lied under oath when discussing the altercation.
474 U.S. at 955–56 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Clearly, the local community had an
interest in a scandal involving a local high-school teacher’s lying under oath about
an incident involving student violence. See also discussion infra Part IV.C.2. The
strong First Amendment values propounded by Justice Brennan do not readily
transfer to commentary about the managing partner at a large private law firm. For
example, there is little, if any, public interest in the size of the year-end bonus
offered to associates at Cravath, Swaine, & Moore. David Lat & Elie Mystal,
Breaking: Cravath Bonuses Are Out; Welcome to the 2011 Bonus Season!,
ABOVETHELAW.COM (Nov. 28, 2011, 4:24 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2011
/11/breaking-cravath-bonuses-are-out-welcome-to-the-2011-bonus-season/#more106389.
194. As the Court reiterated in Rosenblatt: “There is, first, a strong interest in
debate on public issues, and, second, a strong interest in debate about those
persons who are in a position significantly to influence the resolution of those
issues.” Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966).
195. See id. at 83. Stated more concisely, that “[t]he subject matter may have
been only of local interest . . . is constitutionally irrelevant” to the categorization
of the plaintiff as a public official. Id.
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The fact that an individual has become a prominent figure
within a niche does not give rise to the strong First Amendment
polices undergirding the Court’s decision in Gertz. Why hold a
figure, like Evan Chesler, to the practically insurmountable burden
of establishing “actual malice” when he has become well-known in
a community for simply excelling at his job? Evan Chesler has not
thrust himself to the forefront of a public controversy.196 Nor is he
well-known to “a large percentage of the well-informed
citizenry”197 so as to become an “all-purpose” public figure. That
Chesler has accumulated a following within the legal
community198 by performing his job199 does not justify holding
him to the New York Times standard.
Moreover, the “microcelebrity” and “niche celebrity” argument
for overruling Gertz overlooks a large category of potential
defamation plaintiffs: private figures that are neither
“microcelebrities” nor “niche celebrities.” The Rosenbloom
approach suggested by Lat and Shemtob would subject every
defamation plaintiff to the “actual malice” standard if the
defamation related to the plaintiff’s role in a public issue.200
Adopting this standard would essentially leave a large category of
defamation plaintiffs without recourse.201

196. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974).
197. Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publ’ns, 627 F.2d 1287, 1295 n.20 (D.C. Cir.
1980).
198. Chesler may be widely known within the “Big Law” community;
however, it is not readily apparent that he is known by “a large percentage of the
well-informed” members of the legal community. Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at 1295
n.20.
199. Lat and Professor Shemtob compare Chesler’s actions in leading
Cravath to those of the petitioner in Gertz. This analogy does little to support the
authors’ argument. The petitioner in Gertz was a reputable attorney who was
hired to represent a murder victim’s family in a civil action against the murderer.
418 U.S. at 325. A newspaper published an article falsely implying that
petitioner had a criminal record, that he helped plan an attack on Chicago police
during the 1968 Democratic Convention, and that he was a “leninist” and a
“Communist-fronter.” Id. at 326. Why should successful attorneys such as Gertz
and Chesler be held to the strict “actual malice” standard in a defamation action
arising from patently false accusations?
200. See Lat & Shemtob, supra note 164, at 418; Rosenbloom v.
Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 52 (1971), abrogated by Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
201. See Joel D. Eaton, The American Law of Defamation Through Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc. and Beyond: An Analytical Primer, 61 VA. L. REV. 1349,
1373 (1975) (noting that the constitutional privilege for defamation defendants
in an action brought by a public official established in New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan has become a “near-immunity from defamation judgments”).
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Commentators have also suggested that defamatory statements
published online, including twibel, should be subjected to a stricter
standard because the statements are more akin to slander than libel.
B. Tortious Tweets: Libel or Slander? #Twibel
Several scholars have mentioned the possibility of considering
defamatory posts on blogs and Twitter as slander rather than libel.202
Julie Hilden notes that tweets, like slander, are easily repeated to
another person.203 Additionally, tweets are “evanescent,” that is,
they are replaced by newer tweets on a user’s timeline.204 Finally,
Hilden notes that Twitter users are likely to be more careless about
their tweets in the same way that speakers might be careless about
their words in a casual setting.205
The rationale for distinguishing slander from libel is threefold.
First, written publications are permanent; whereas, conversations
are fleeting.206 Second, the written word is capable of broader
circulation than the spoken word.207 Third, the act of reducing
defamation to writing evidences a greater element of intent on the
part of the publisher than orally communicating false statements of
fact.208
Simply put, tweets do not conform to the policies underlying
the distinction between slander and libel. Tweets are permanent.
Although individual tweets eventually vanish from the bottom of a
user’s timeline, they remain accessible through the search function
on Twitter and even through search engines like Google.209
Additionally, tweets are certainly capable of wide circulation
through original publication to a user’s followers and subsequent
re-tweets from the followers.
202. See Reynolds, supra note 164, at 1165; Hilden, supra note 164. If twibel
were treated as slander rather than libel, plaintiffs would only recover damages
if they were able to prove that the defamatory tweet caused “special damages.”
See SACK, supra note 36, § 2.3, at 2-10.
203. Hilden, supra note 164.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. SACK, supra note 36, § 2.3, at 2-10.
207. Id.
208. Id. The intent element derives from the idea that reducing a statement to
writing is more of an intentional act than saying something in a conversation. A
person is more likely to accidentally say something than to accidentally publish
a statement in writing.
209. Moreover, every public tweet is catalogued in the Library of Congress.
Matt Reymond, How Tweet It Is!: Library Acquires Entire Twitter Archive,
LIBRARY OF CONG. (April 14, 2010), http://blogs.loc.gov/loc/2010/04/howtweet-it-is-library-acquires-entire-twitter-archive/.
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The difference in intent with regard to tweets and conversation
is less clear. Twitter users might post a tweet without fully thinking
through the consequences in the same way that a person may
reveal an idea in a conversation with a friend without much
thought.210 Indeed, some tweets may be attributed to an accidental
slip of the tongue. The possibility that a defamatory tweet is posted
with a lower level of intent than a statement published in a more
traditional form does not, however, override the fact that tweets are
more permanent than the spoken word and are capable of wide
circulation.
The aforementioned arguments in favor of revising the
defamation analysis do not comport with the Court’s rationale in
New York Times and its progeny. Additionally, they are
unnecessary revisions that over-complicate an already confusing
area of law. Trial courts will be better served to continue to apply
traditional defamation law, regardless of the publication medium.
IV. @COURTS: IF IT AIN’T BROKE, DON’T FIX IT
The rise in Twitter’s popularity has triggered a
contemporaneous growth in twibel lawsuits.211 This Part will
demonstrate that the standards set forth in the Court’s defamation
jurisprudence remain workable, despite recent changes in
technology. This Part first explains how the Gertz public–private
figure distinction212 can be approached in twibel claims. Second,
this Part explores Twitter’s impact on the Dun & Bradstreet
subject matter considerations.213 Finally, this Part discusses the
importance of considering tweets in the context214 of
contemporaneously published tweets for the purpose of identifying
210. The Supreme Court of Western Australia commented on the emerging
distinction between traditional and electronic media, noting the possibility that a
user might post a message online without the proper consideration:
Emails, SMS messaging, Twitter, blogs and other forms of social
media such as Facebook impact on the way people communicate and
the language they use. Communications through those media often lack
the formality and careful consideration that was once thought to mark
the difference between the written and spoken word. The very purpose
of the media is to enable people to communicate instantaneously, often
in a language that is blunt in its message and attenuated in its form.
That will affect both what is regarded as defamatory and the potential
for harm.
Prefumo v. Bradley [2011] WASC 251, ¶ 43 (Austl.).
211. See supra Introduction.
212. See supra Part I.C.1.c.
213. See supra Part I.D.1.
214. See supra text accompanying note 32.
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matters of public concern and distinguishing false factual
statements from statements of pure opinion.
A. @Courts: The Gertz @Public–PrivateFigure Distinction
Remains Relevant
In Gertz, the Court noted the characteristics of public figures
that justify the distinction between public and private figures in
defamation lawsuits.215 The “all-purpose” public figure “may
achieve such pervasive fame or notoriety that he becomes a public
figure for all purposes and in all contexts.”216 The “limitedpurpose” public figure, on the other hand, “injects himself or is
drawn into a particular public controversy and thereby becomes a
public figure for a limited range of issues.”217 The critical feature
of public figures, according to the Court, is that they “assume
special prominence in the resolution of public questions.”218
As discussed above, lower courts have expounded the Gertz
criteria to establish a test for distinguishing between public and
private figures.219 A straightforward application of tests like the
Waldbaum analysis220 will yield accurate results, even in the
context of modern twibel claims.
For example, lower courts have required an individual to
essentially achieve “celebrity” status to be considered an “allpurpose” public figure.221 This inquiry is readily applicable to
twibel plaintiffs. One does not gain or lose celebrity status simply
by being discussed on Twitter. If the plaintiff in a traditional
defamation case222 would be considered an “all-purpose” public
figure, he should be considered an “all-purpose” public figure as
the plaintiff in a twibel claim. For instance, if the roles were
215. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344–45 (1974).
216. Id. at 351.
217. Id.
218. Id. Basing the public–private figure distinction on the individual’s
“special prominence in the resolution of public questions” seems to require
courts to first decide whether the issues underlying the individual’s alleged
“public figure status” indeed constitute a public question, thereby forcing courts
to examine the public nature of two separate issues in the process of determining
whether “actual malice” applies.
219. See supra Part I.C.2.
220. See supra Part I.C.2. The Waldbaum Court set forth useful tests for
identifying both “all-purpose” public figures and “limited-purpose” public
figures.
221. See, e.g., Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publ’ns, Inc., 627 F.2d 1287, 1294
(D.C. Cir. 1980).
222. This section uses the term traditional defamation case to refer to a
defamation case involving traditional media, such as a newspaper or the radio.
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reversed223 in Simorangkir v. Love,224 Ms. Love would likely be an
“all-purpose” public figure225 and be required to prove that
Simorangkir acted with “actual malice” in order to recover
damages. Conversely, if the plaintiff in a traditional defamation
action has not achieved the pervasive notoriety required for “allpurpose” public figure status, he should not be labeled as such just
because the defamatory statement was published on Twitter.226
The “limited-purpose” public figure analysis should be applied
in a similar fashion. The test set forth in Waldbaum requires courts
to consider three factors when defining the plaintiff’s public or
private figure status: (1) whether there is a public controversy; (2)
whether the plaintiff thrusts himself to the forefront of the public
controversy; and (3) whether the defamation directly addresses the
plaintiff’s role in the public controversy.227 To extend this test to
twibel claims, courts need only take special care in defining the
scope and origin of the public controversy. One of two possible
scenarios will emerge once the controversy is defined.
First, the public controversy may have originated on Twitter.228
In this case, the court should consider the number of times the
plaintiff tweeted in an effort to help resolve the issue and the extent
to which the plaintiff addressed the issue through other mediums.
For Twitter-specific controversies, evidence will be readily
available (because public tweets are immortalized in the Library of
Congress229) to provide concrete examples of the plaintiff’s
voluntary immersion in the resolution of the controversy. If the
plaintiff has only tangentially involved himself in the dispute, he
223. That is, if Love sued Simrangkir for a defamatory tweet.
224. See supra text accompanying notes 4–15.
225. Love’s infamous status as the “most controversial woman in the history
of rock,” in addition to her highly publicized marriage to the late Kurt Cobain is
likely sufficient to classify her as an “all-purpose” public figure. See Chris
Harris, Courtney Love Loses Temporary Legal Control of Frances Bean,
ROLLING STONE, Dec. 14, 2009, http://www.rollingstone.com/music/news
/courtney-love-loses-temporary-legal-control-of-frances-bean-20091214.
226. For instance, Dr. Darm likely has not achieved sufficient “fame” or
“notoriety” to be considered an “all-purpose” public figure by virtue of his
profession alone in his twibel action against Tiffany Craig. See supra text
accompanying notes 19–23.
227. See Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publ’ns, Inc., 627 F.2d 1287, 1296 (D.C.
Cir. 1980); see also supra Part I.C.2.b.
228. Twitter-specific public controversies will likely be rare, but the scenario
might emerge if a certain topic gained sufficient coverage as a “trending topic.”
See About Trending Topics, supra note 32. The possibility remains that enough
Twitter users might debate a public issue on Twitter enough to establish a
“controversy” even though the issue has not arisen to the level of a
“controversy” in the traditional media.
229. See Reymond, supra note 209.

2013]

COMMENT

591

should not be classified as a “limited-purpose” public figure, and
the state-defined level of fault is applicable.230
The second and more likely scenario that might arise when
courts define the origin of the public controversy is that the dispute
originated outside the realm of Twitter. In this case, the analysis
should proceed in the same manner that it would if the defamatory
statement were published in a different form. The defamer’s choice
of medium is irrelevant for the issue of defining the plaintiff’s
public or private status.
Essentially, courts should distinguish public figures (whether
“all-purpose” or “limited-purpose”) from private figures in twibel
claims in the same manner that courts make this distinction in a
traditional defamation claim. The fact that the defamatory
statement was posted on Twitter does not change the extent of the
plaintiff’s involvement in the resolution of a public controversy.
As such, there appears to be no barrier to applying the Waldbaum
analysis, or similar tests, for the purpose of distinguishing between
public and private figure twibel plaintiffs. The ease with which
these analyses transfer to twibel claims is mirrored in other areas
of defamation law, including the public–private subject matter
considerations.
B. Hashtag Relevance: Defining #MattersOfPublicConcern
The public or private nature of a twibelous statement can be
readily discerned by logically analyzing the subject matter of the
statement. Again, two scenarios are possible where the statement
relates to a “matter of public concern.”231 First, the statement may
clearly concern a matter of broad public interest, such as a
presidential election. In this case, the fact that the claim arose from
a tweet is irrelevant, and the claim should be analyzed in the same
way as a defamation claim arising from a traditional publication.
The second scenario might arise when the defamatory tweet
concerns an important issue, not to the public as a whole, but to a
specific online community.232 To gauge the public’s interest in the
230. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974).
231. There is, of course, a third scenario that would arise when the tweet
bears no relation to a matter of public concern.
232. This scenario is possible when the twibel plaintiff has voluntarily thrust
himself or herself to the forefront of a “trending topic.” See supra text
accompanying note 32. Additionally, this scenario could arise when the tweet
centers on a specific issue that is of great importance for a specific group of
people. For example, tweets that focus on defamation on Twitter may be
important to First Amendment scholars who are trying to determine how the
issue will be resolved.
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subject matter, courts may use “Twitter Search”233 or “Advanced
Twitter Search”234 to determine the frequency with which users are
discussing an issue on Twitter. Furthermore, users’ inclusion of the
hashtag should aid courts in deciding whether the defamatory
statement relates to an issue about which other users have voiced
concern. If a “Twitter Search” reveals tweets containing a hashtag
relevant to the defamatory tweet at issue, a court may click on the
hashtag to reveal other tweets on the same topic.235
“Hashtag tracking” may be used as an additional means to
consider the public nature of the allegedly defamatory tweet’s
subject matter. Frequently used hashtags are tracked as “trending
topics.”236 Although treating oft-tweeted topics as matters of public
concern may broaden the category of speech included in “matters
of public concern,”237 considering “trending topics” will allow
courts to appreciate modern concerns that are appealing to a larger
community instead of limiting the inquiry to traditional topics.
One might argue that the 140-character limit for tweets may
limit a court’s ability to discern the specific subject matter of the
defamatory statement in some cases.238 When a tweet appears to
contain an incomplete thought, courts should look to see whether
the tweet was posted by itself or contemporaneously with
subsequent tweets that clarify the author’s message. If the
defamatory tweet is published alone without at least partially
implicating a public issue, the tweet should be characterized as one
relating to a matter of purely private concern. If, however, the
tweet is posted contemporaneously with other tweets, the court

233. Users may use the “search” feature on Twitter to search for tweets about a
certain topic. How to Search on Twitter, TWITTER, https://support.twitter
.com/groups/31-twitter-basics/topics/110-search/articles/132700-how-to-search-ontwitter (last visited Jan. 2, 2013).
234. The “advanced search” feature can be used to fine tune search results if
the basic search feature did not reveal the desired results. How to Use Advanced
Twitter Search, TWITTER, https://support.twitter.com/groups/31-twitter-basics
/topics/110-search/articles/71577-how-to-use-advanced-twitter-search (last visited
Nov. 6, 2011).
235. See What Are Hashtags (“#” Symbols)?, supra note 159 (“Clicking on a
hashtagged word in any message shows you all other Tweets marked with that
keyword.”).
236. FAQs About Twitter’s Trends, supra note 32.
237. By including topics that would not traditionally be considered public
questions.
238. The 140-character limit on Tweets may limit the user’s ability to publish
his or her entire message in a single tweet. Tweets reflecting incomplete
thoughts might be misconstrued if not properly analyzed in the context of
contemporaneously published tweets. See infra Part IV.C.
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must engage in a context analysis to determine whether the overall
thrust of the message addresses a matter of public concern.239
C. Referring to Contemporaneously Published Tweets for
#ContextAnalysis
1. Using Concurrent Tweets to Identify
#MattersOfPublicConcern
At times, a tweet’s relevance to a matter of public concern may
be difficult to determine due to the 140-character limitation. In these
cases, courts must examine the “content, form, and context” of the
twibelous statement.240 Presently, it is unclear whether the context
of a single tweet includes tweets published contemporaneously by
the defendant for the purposes of determining whether a tweet
relates to a matter of public concern.241 This Comment argues that
courts should consider the user’s related tweets in determining
whether the allegedly libelous tweet addresses a matter of public
concern.242
The scope of the appropriate “context analysis” will be defined
more easily, and the end result will be more just, if courts adopt a
simplified approach for determining the context of a libelous tweet.
Due to the 140-character limitation and the resulting limitation on
the amount of information that can be included in a tweet,243
239. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc, 472 U.S. 749,
761 (1985) (“Whether . . . speech addresses a matter of public concern must be
determined by [the expression’s] content, form, and context . . . .” (emphasis
added) (quoting Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138, 147–48 (1983))); see also
Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1217 (2011) (holding that when the “overall
thrust” of the communication relates to a matter of public concern, the
communication should be protected).
240. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 472 U.S. at 762 (1985) (emphasis added)
(quoting Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138, 147–48 (1983)).
241. Lyrissa Lidsky, A Libel Proof Defendant? Courtney Love’s Twitter
Defamation, PRAWFSBLAWG (Feb. 5, 2011, 6:27 PM), http://prawfsblawg
.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2011/02/a-libel-proof-defendant-courtney-lovestwitter-defamation.html.
242. This approach is comparable to the Court’s analysis in Snyder, 131 S.
Ct. at 1217. There, the Court considered all of the protest signs together to
conclude that the “overall thrust and dominant theme of Westboro’s
demonstration spoke to broader public issues.” Id.
243. Furthermore, the user forfeits additional characters if the tweeter inserts a
hashtag. See How to Post Links (URLs) in Tweets, TWITTER, https://support
.twitter.com/groups/31-twitter-basics/topics/109-tweets-messages/articles/78124–
how-to-post-links-urls (last visited Dec. 18, 2012) (noting that links posted in
tweets may be shortened to 20 characters but still detract from the 140-character
allotment). The inclusion of links in the 140-character limit supports the
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fairness dictates that contemporaneously published tweets should
be considered in determining whether the tweet at issue relates to a
matter of public concern. Twitter is a valuable medium for
discussing important issues, but if tweets are singled out and
examined in a vacuum, users may be less likely to discuss
important issues for fear of being punished for a statement that is
subject to multiple interpretations when taken out of context. The
possible self-censorship that might result from this form of
interpretation is contrary to the policies underlying the First
Amendment.244
At first glance, this issue appears to be straightforward. Why
wouldn’t courts look to the lines directly above and below the
tweet in question to determine a tweet’s relevance to matters of
public concern? The complication emerges when the tweet is
considered from the perspective of the tweeter’s audience. When a
user signs in to his Twitter account, he is presented with his
“timeline,” which publishes all of the tweets published by any user
that he follows on Twitter. The tweets appear in real time rather
than appearing in an order prescribed by the user.245 Therefore, a
tweeter that follows a large number of people may receive a large
number of tweets at one time. This has the effect of possibly
creating a large separation between a single user’s tweets
published only minutes apart.246
The problems with a “context analysis” that considers
contemporaneously published tweets alongside the allegedly
defamatory tweet for purposes of defining the tweet’s relevance to
a matter of public importance do not outweigh the First
Amendment ramifications of analyzing single tweets under a
microscope. Ultimately, refusing to consider tweets that may
clarify the author’s message will chill speech because users will be
less likely to discuss important public issues on Twitter if, in so
proposition that contemporaneously published tweets should be considered with
the allegedly defamatory tweet because, although links reduce the number of
characters a user may dedicate to his personal message, they may help link the
statement to a public issue. Inserting an @mention does not detract from the 140character limit. See About Tweets (Twitter Updates), supra note 148.
244. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964) (“The
rule thus dampens the vigor and limits the variety of public debate . . . . It is
inconsistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments.”).
245. See What Is a Twitter Timeline?, supra note 142.
246. For instance, User A may post a tweet which appears on one of his
follower’s, User B’s, timeline. While User A is formulating a related tweet, User
B may receive tweets from Users C, D, and E. Therefore, when User A posts the
second tweet, it will be separated from his first tweet on User B’s timeline by the
three tweets from other users.
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doing, they run the risk of being subjected to a large damage award
for libel. Moreover, the ambiguity that might arise if intervening
tweets separate related messages from a single user may be
resolved if the audience investigates the twibelous statement
further by clicking on the tweet. When a user clicks on the name of
the user who posted the original tweet, a pop-up window appears
above the user’s timeline, providing additional information related
to that message.247 Thus, clicking on a user’s name above his or
her tweet will immediately place the defamatory tweet in the
context of other tweets that were published around the same time.
Moreover, clicking on the user’s name in the pop-up window will
redirect the viewer to the tweeter’s full profile, thereby revealing
all of the user’s tweets. Therefore, a proper “context analysis” will
consider contemporaneously published tweets to ensure that the
court views the twibelous statement in the same context as a user
viewing the tweet.248 This sort of analysis should provide the court
with sufficient information to determine the tweet’s relevance to
important public issues and reduce the danger of mischaracterizing
the tweet.
2. Using Concurrent Tweets to Identify #StatementsOfFact
The “context analysis” described above should also be applied
to distinguish statements of fact from statements conveying the
author’s opinion. For an expression to form the basis of a
defamation lawsuit, it must include a false statement of fact.249
Statements amounting to nothing more than “rhetorical hyperbole”
or “epithets” are not considered to be defamatory.250

247. See What Is a Twitter Timeline?, supra note 142. The added information
includes the tweeting user’s most recent tweets.
248. When considering a user’s tweets as a whole for the purpose of
establishing the public nature of the tweet’s subject matter, courts should
consider the length of time between the various tweets. Because a user’s
timeline is updated in real time as tweets are posted, tweets posted within a short
period of time will likely appear in close proximity to each other on the timeline
of the users following the tweeter. While there is a possibility that a small lapse
of several minutes would allow other users’ tweets to interrupt the string of
thought from a single user, the probability increases significantly with a longer
lapse in time. Therefore, delayed publication of subsequent tweets that clarify
the user’s message should be valued less than tweets published only moments
later.
249. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1990).
250. Greenbelt Coop. Publ’g Ass’n, Inc. v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 13–14
(1970).
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The Court’s decision in Milkovich v. Lorain Journal
Company251 highlights the importance of considering twibelous
statements in the context of contemporaneously published tweets
for this purpose. The petitioner in Milkovich was a high school
wrestling coach who sued a local newspaper for defamation,
alleging that an article it published accused him of perjury.252 The
Court granted certiorari to consider whether statements of opinion
are privileged under the First Amendment in defamation cases.253
Specifically, the Court discussed whether a piece of dicta from
Gertz supported an opinion exemption:
Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false
idea. However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend
for its correctness not on the conscience of judges and
juries, but on the competition of other ideas. But there is no
constitutional value in false statements of fact.254
The Court rejected the newspaper’s argument that, under this
passage from Gertz, statements of opinion are absolutely protected
in defamation actions.255 Rather, the Court held that “the
‘breathing space’ which ‘[f]reedoms of expression require in order
to survive’ is adequately secured by existing constitutional
doctrine256 without the creation of an artificial dichotomy between
‘opinion’ and fact.”257 Furthermore, statements of opinion can also

251. 497 U.S. 1.
252. Id. at 6. The article’s headline and nine statements in the body of the
article implied that Petitioner lied under oath during a judicial proceeding
regarding an incident involving Petitioner and his wrestling team at a wrestling
match. Id. at 3.
253. Id. at 10.
254. Id. at 18 (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339–40
(1974)).
255. Id. at 18.
256. See Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986) (requiring
the plaintiff in a defamation action to prove falsity as well as fault); Greenbelt
Coop. Publ’g Ass’n, Inc. v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 13–14 (1970) (finding that the
word blackmail was not defamatory under the circumstances because “even the
most careless reader must have perceived the word was no more than rhetorical
hyperbole, a vigorous epithet”); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46,
50 (1988) (holding that the First Amendment protects ad parody focused on a
public-figure plaintiff which “could not reasonably have been interpreted as
stating actual facts about the public figures involved”); Letter Carriers v. Austin,
418 U.S. 264, 284–86 (1974). (The word traitor was not defamatory under the
circumstances because it was used “in a loose, figurative sense” and was
“merely rhetorical hyperbole, a lusty and imaginative expression of the
contempt felt by union members.”).
257. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 19 (citations omitted).
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imply a false statement of fact.258 Thus, the essential question for
determining whether a statement is actionable is whether a
reasonable reader would conclude that the communication implies
a factual assertion about the plaintiff.259 The Milkovich Court
found that the headline and nine statements in the article, read
together, implied that Petitioner perjured himself at the judicial
proceeding.260 If the statements were found to be factually false,261
Petitioner would be permitted to recover upon a showing that the
newspaper acted with the requisite level of fault.262
Just as the statements in the Milkovich publication were
considered together, tweets published together must be read in the
context of one another to determine whether a “reasonable
factfinder”263 would conclude that the tweet conveys a provably
258. Id. at 18. Although the Milkovich Court held that opinion is not per se
protected by the Constitution, oftentimes opinion can neither be proved true nor
false. Because a plaintiff must prove falsity to prevail, opinion remains protected
as a matter of constitutional law in many cases. See SACK, supra note 36, §
4.2.4.2, at 4-15 (citing Andrews v. Stalling, 892 P.2d 611 (N.M. Ct. App.
1995)).
259. See Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 21 (“The dispositive question in the present
case then becomes whether a reasonable factfinder could conclude that the
statements in the Diadiun column imply an assertion that petitioner Milkovich
perjured himself . . . . ”).
260. Id.
261. The Court reasoned that a perjury action would be able to determine
whether or not Petitioner did, in fact, perjure himself. Id. Once transcripts and
witnesses were presented, the lower court would be in a position to determine
whether the statements in the article were actually “false statements of fact.” Id.
262. Petitioner would either be required to prove the newspaper acted with
“actual malice” or with the state supplied level of fault per Gertz. The Court did
not discuss whether Petitioner was to be classified as a public figure, but the
Ohio Supreme Court noted in dicta that Petitioner was likely to be considered a
public figure. See Scott v. News-Herald, 496 N.E.2d 699, 704 (Ohio 1986) (“To
say that Milkovich nevertheless was not a public figure for purposes of
discussion about the controversy is simply nonsense.” (quoting Lorain Journal
Co. v. Milkovich, 474 U.S. 953, 964 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting))).
263. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 21. See also Mashburn v. Collin, 355 So. 2d 879,
885 (La. 1977) (“Words which, taken by themselves, would appear to be a
positive allegation of fact, may be shown by the context to be a mere expression
of opinion or argumentative influence.”); Gray v. St. Martin’s Press, Inc., 221
F.3d 243, 248–49 (1st Cir. 2000) (“Whether calling something a ‘fake’ is or is
not protected opinion depends very much on what is meant and therefore on
context.”). Moreover, as the New York Court of Appeals stated:
To illustrate, if the statement “John is a thief” is actionable when
considered in its applicable context, the statement “I believe John is a
thief” would be equally actionable when placed in precisely the same
context. By the same token, however, the assertion that “John is a thief”
could well be treated as an expression of opinion or rhetorical
hyperbole when it is accompanied by other statements, such as “John
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false statement of fact.264 The 140-character limitation might limit
the reasonable interpretation inquiry in the same way that it may
hinder courts trying to identify a tweet’s relevance to a matter of
public concern.265 An author may not be able to provide sufficient
information in 140 characters to fully explicate his position.
Therefore, a court must look beyond the tweet at issue to fully
grasp the author’s message.266
Julie Hilden offered a different approach for distinguishing
statements of fact from statements of pure opinion. Hilden noted
that tweeters should develop a way to verify that a tweet reflects
the author’s opinion and does not reflect a statement of fact, such
as using the abbreviation “IMHO” (“in my humble opinion”).267
Although the solution seems simple enough, inserting an opinion
disclaimer is likely insufficient by itself to grant the statement
constitutional protection alone. As the Court stated in Milkovich,
“[s]imply couching such statements in terms of opinion does not
dispel these implications; and the statement, ‘In my opinion Jones
is a liar,’ can cause as much damage to reputation as the statement,
‘Jones is a liar.’”268 Or as Judge Friendly noted: “[It] would be
destructive of the law of libel if a writer could escape liability for
accusations of [defamatory conduct] simply by using, explicitly or
implicitly, the words ‘I think.’”269
In Finkel v. Dauber,270 an Internet user filed a defamation suit
against several adolescent Facebook271 users, alleging that posts

stole my heart,” that, taken in context, convey to the reasonable reader
that something other than an objective fact is being asserted.
Gross v. New York Times Co., 623 N.E.2d 1163, 1169 (N.Y. 1993).
264. See Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 21.
265. See supra Part IV.B.
266. As the New Jersey Supreme Court stated in Leers v. Green:
The distinction between an allegation of fact and expression of opinion
. . . often depends on what is stated in the rest of the [communication].
If the defendant accurately states what some public man has really
done, and then asserts that ‘such conduct is disgraceful,’ this is merely
[a nonactionable] expression of his opinion, his comments on the
plaintiff’s conduct.
131 A.2d 781, 787 (N.J. 1957) (quoting ODGERS, LIBEL AND SLANDER 166 (6th
ed. 1929)). This statement remains relevant post-Milkovich. See SACK, supra
note 36, § 4.3.1, at 4-30.
267. Hilden, supra note 164.
268. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 19.
269. Cianci v. New Times Publ’g Co., 639 F.2d 54, 64 (2d Cir. 1980).
270. 906 N.Y.S.2d 697 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010).
271. Facebook is a social media website dedicated to giving “people the
power to share and make the world more open and connected.” Facebook—
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made to a “secret group”272 damaged her reputation.273 The posts
included statements that the plaintiff was seen having sexual
relations with a horse, contracted HIV from sharing needles with
heroin addicts, contracted AIDS from a male prostitute, and
transformed into the devil.274 The defendants moved for partial
summary judgment on the issue of liability.275 The trial court
granted the defendants’ motion, noting:
A reasonable reader, given the context of the posts, simply
would not believe that the Plaintiff contracted AIDS by
having sex with a horse or a baboon or that she contracted
AIDS from a male prostitute who also gave her crabs and
syphilis, or that having contracted sexually transmitted
diseases in such a manner she morphed into the devil.
Taken together, the statements can only be read as puerile
attempts by adolescents to outdo each other.276
Rather than scrutinize each comment posted to the Facebook
group individually, the court analyzed the posts in the context of
one another.277
The Finkel decision demonstrates the importance of fully
analyzing the context of defamatory tweets. If the Finkel Court
analyzed each post separately, the statements might reasonably be
interpreted as stating actual facts about the plaintiff. But when
analyzed together, the Facebook posts were properly considered to
be nonactionable rhetorical hyperbole.278 By following the Finkel
Court’s approach, courts will mitigate the challenges imposed by
Twitter’s 140-character limitation and ensure that tweets

About, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/facebook?sk=info (last visited
Dec. 18, 2012).
272. The statements posted to the secret group were not visible to anyone
other than the six members of the group. Finkel, 906 N.Y.S.2d at 700.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 700.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 702.
277. See id. (quoting Guerrero v. Carva, 779 N.Y.S.2d 12, 18 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2004)) (“[T]he courts should look to the over-all context in which the
assertions were made and determine on that basis whether the reasonable reader
would have believed that the challenged statements were conveying facts about
the libel plaintiff.”).
278. See Finkel, 906 N.Y.S.2d at 702. The Finkel Court did not actually label
the statements as “rhetorical hyperbole” but chalked the posts up to be a “vulgar
attempt at humor.” Id. The critical point in the decision is that, considered
together, the posts would not be interpreted by a reasonable reader to convey
provably false statements of fact. Id.
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surmounting to no more than “rhetorical hyperbole” or “vigorous
epithets” are not misconstrued as asserting actionable false
statements of fact.
As this Comment has argued, traditional defamation law
remains applicable decades after New York Times was decided.
Twibel claims, an unheard-of form of defamation at the time the
Court began interpreting the First Amendment implications of state
defamation law, may be analyzed under the traditional defamation
framework originally applied to defamatory statements in
newspapers and radio broadcasting.
CONCLUSION
In many regards, Twitter has revolutionized modern
communication. Hundreds of thousands of people log in to Twitter
every day to read the news, share interesting stories, and connect
with their peers. For the first time in history, the average citizen
has the ability to participate in the same forum as celebrities,
politicians, major news networks, and famous athletes. The
transformation in electronic media will soon force a court to
answer one question: Must the law adapt to give leeway to the
inexperienced citizen-publisher, or must tweeters279 remain
mindful of the carefully crafted compromise between the core
values implicit in the First Amendment and society’s interest in
redressing the injury caused by fictitious attacks on reputation set
forth in the string of case law following New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan? This Comment argues that the latter is the appropriate
approach. Rather than engage in a superfluous discussion of legal
theory, this Comment has set forth a realistic, step-by-step
approach that will guide a trial court in applying the traditional
defamation framework to the modern twibel claim.
Patrick H. Hunt∗

279. And others who employ the new forms of electronic communication.
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